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international legal updates
North America
Arizona’s SB 1070: Endangers
Vulnerable Groups
Absent national immigration reform,
Arizona’s state legislature passed
Arizona Senate Bill 1070, also called the
Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act (Act). The legislation
requires police to inquire into the immigration status of individuals whom an officer
has reasonable suspicion are in the country
illegally and to detain those individuals
who cannot prove their legal immigration
status. Similar legislation has been proposed by other states throughout the U.S.
The potential impact of the Act on asylum
seekers, victims of human trafficking, and
domestic violence victims is particularly
concerning. Immigrants in these situations
may be undocumented for the purposes of
the Act.
The Act creates a state crime of “[w]
illful failure to complete or carry an alien
registration document.” However, a person
is only guilty of a misdemeanor if he or she
violates 8 U.S.C.§ 1304(e) or § 1306(a),
requiring individuals to carry a federally
issued Alien Registration Certificate or
Receipt Card. The Act is not applicable to
individuals who have valid visas or other
grounds to remain in the U.S. Under the
Act, a person is presumed to be lawfully
present in the U.S. if the person provides
the officer any of the following: a valid
Arizona driver’s license, non-operating
identification license, tribal identification,
or valid U.S. federal, state or local government issued identification, if proof of lawful residency or citizenship is required to
obtain the identification.
Individuals who have applied for asylum can remain in the U.S. while awaiting
adjudication of their application; however,
they may only have the forms that they
submitted or receipt notices from U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS). The Act fails to provide instructions for police if an alien claims that his
or her application is pending, and is also
silent about whether USCIS receipt notices
qualify under the fourth category of valid

proof of lawful presence. This ambiguity
gives law enforcement broad discretion,
which may lead to abuse and the unjustified detention of individuals who have initiated the process to legalize their status in
the U.S. Failing to recognize USCIS receipt
notices carried by an asylum applicant and
detaining an individual awaiting adjudication of his asylum application contravenes
Article 31 of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, as modified by
the 1967 Protocol, prohibiting countries
from penalizing refugees because of illegal
entry if they are fleeing persecution. As
a state party to the protocol, the U.S. is
bound by Article 31.
The Act also endangers human trafficking victims, many of whom are undocumented immigrants. Some enter the U.S.
legally and willingly, but their immigration
status expires after they are enslaved; others are forced to travel to the U.S. through
legal means or are voluntarily smuggled
in, but are enslaved upon arrival. Even
after a human trafficking victim escapes,
he or she may still be vulnerable to arrest
and detention under the Act. Victims of
trafficking awaiting T or U visas may lack
required proof of lawful presence under
the Act. By criminalizing the failure to
produce this proof, the Act punishes the
victims instead of the traffickers.
Local law enforcement is in a difficult
position — it must uphold Arizona law,
while the United States is bound by its obligation under the trafficking Protocol. The
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women
and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, states that a country
should provide for the physical safety of
trafficking victims within its territory and
adopt appropriate measures allowing victims to stay temporarily or permanently.
Although the U.S. provides protective measures for victims of trafficking through
the T and U visa programs, the Act threatens the effectiveness of these programs
because victims may be subject to arrest
and detention while they wait for their visa
to be granted.
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Undocumented victims of domestic violence are also vulnerable and less
likely to seek help under the new Act. The
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 212(a)(6)(A)(ii) provides a waiver to
domestic violence victims who unlawfully
entered the U.S. This waiver allows victims
to remain in the U.S. through a self-petition
for legal status under the federal Violence
Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA). The
victims must file a police report to begin
the visa application process. However, the
Act adds an additional element of fear of
law enforcement, which may discourage
victims from reporting abuse.
In reshaping its immigration policy,
the U.S. has both domestic and international legal obligations to protect vulnerable groups. However, the Act fails to
provide this protection. U.S. immigration
policy, whether formulated by states or
the national government, must conform to
international legal obligations.

Allegations Against Canada for
Complicity in Torture of Afghans
A Canadian Parliamentary committee recently heard testimony suggesting that Canada’s policy of transferring
Afghan detainees to Afghan security
forces amounted to complicity in torture. In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) assumed control
of the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) and its mandate to assist the
Afghan Interim Authority in maintaining
security. Initially, ISAF transferred detainees to U.S. forces. However, since 2005,
NATO has transferred detainees directly
to the National Directorate of Security
(NDS), Afghanistan’s intelligence service.
International obligations, such as Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, the
International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), and the UN
Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT) prohibit NATO member
states from exposing detainees to a substantial risk of torture. However, civil society
and government representatives expressed
concern that detainees transferred to the
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NDS may be subject to torture. By 2008,
Canada had quietly suspended detainee
transfers.
Richard Colvin, former diplomat with
Canada’s mission in Afghanistan, remarked
in 2009 to a Parliamentary committee on
the Afghanistan mission, “[a]ccording to
our information, the likelihood is that all
the Afghans we handed over were tortured.
For interrogators in Kandahar, it was standard operating procedure.” As a member
of NATO, Canada’s reticence to continue
NATO’s practice of detainee transfer raises
important questions for NATO and its constituent forces.
According to the International
Committee for the Red Cross, the conflict
in Afghanistan ended when the transitional government was established in 2002.
Nevertheless, all parties to the conflict
must, at a minimum, abide by Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
requiring the humane treatment of all individuals not participating in the conflict,
including civilians and wounded, captured,
and surrendered combatants. Thus, under
Common Article 3 and the rules of customary international humanitarian law, transferring detainees to a state where they may
be tortured is a serious breach of Canada’s
international obligations. Additionally,
allegations of torture, if substantiated,
could mean Afghanistan failed to comply
with Common Article 3.
International treaties including the
ICCPR and the CAT, to which Canada and
Afghanistan are state parties, also prohibit
torture. Article 4 of the ICCPR provides
that “[In] time[s] of public emergency”
states may not derogate from the prohibition on torture. Moreover, the non-refoulement principle of customary international
law, contained in Article 3(1) of the CAT,
specifically prohibits the expulsion, return,
or extradition of a person to a state where
there are substantial grounds for believing
that he may be subject to torture. Under
Article 1 of the CAT, the obligations of
states parties also extend to official complicity in, consent, or acquiescence to acts
of torture. Article 2 requires state parties
to take effective measures to prevent torture in territory under their jurisdiction,
and Article 4 requires all State Parties to
prohibit participation and complicity in
torture. According to the Human Rights
Committee (HRC), the absolute prohibition on transferring detainees to where

they risk torture or other ill-treatment is
incorporated in the prohibition on torture
and other ill-treatment itself. Also, some
argue that a state’s obligation not to torture
or ill-treat detainees extends to the conditions to which detainees are transferred.
Amnesty International USA points out, “A
state cannot claim to be treating detainees
humanely while knowingly handing them
over to torturers — be they within one
state outside it, citizens of the same state
or officials of another — anymore than
it can knowingly ‘release’ detainees in a
minefield and claim that their safety is no
longer its responsibility.”
In a legal opinion prepared for the
HCR in 2001, international lawyer Elihu
Lauterpacht and Queen’s Counsel to the
Foreign Office of the United Kingdom,
Daniel Bethlehem, argued that a state’s
obligation under the principle of nonrefoulement has no limitation or exceptions. As a state party to the CAT, Canada
cannot transfer detainees if there are substantial grounds to believe that they may
be tortured. Canadian military officials
received numerous warnings from diplomatic staff regarding potential torture and
knew of incidents in which a prisoner with
marks on his body was found near “a pair
of suspicious cables.”
In February 2007, Amnesty International
Canada and the British Columbia Civil
Liberties Association filed for an order
from the Federal Court of Canada to cease
detainee transfers and require Canada to
account for individuals previously transferred. The Federal Court of Canada and the
Military Police Complaints Commission,
an independent quasi-judicial body established by the Canadian Parliament, are
evaluating the military’s knowledge of torture in Afghan prisons.
NATO forces are faced with a difficult decision. The institutional arrangement between NATO and the Afghan security forces has failed to protect detainees
from torture. The findings of the Federal
Court of Canada and the Military Police
Complaints Commission will be internationally significant as they may critique
NATO policy regarding the transfer of
Afghan detainees — a policy that many
countries have adopted.
Aimee Mayer, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
North America for the Human Rights Brief.
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Latin America
Criminalizing Social Movements
in Peru
Peru has taken a dangerous step
toward endangering social protestors by
passing Decree Law 1095 (Decree 1095)
on September 1, 2010. Decree 1905 is
a response to protests by communities
against a national irrigation project. The
law permits deployment of the military during civil unrest, including demonstrations,
and the use of military courts for prosecuting any “illicit conduct” by soldiers during
protests. The use of military courts to prosecute human rights abuses is in violation
of international human rights standards.
Moreover, deploying the military (trained
to fight armies, not police civilians) to
manage social protests comes precariously
close to violating human rights, including
the right of assembly and freedom of association listed in Articles 15 and 16 of the
American Convention on Human Rights,
to which Peru is a signatory.
Most significantly, Decree 1095 authorizes the use of military courts to hear
complaints of human rights abuses committed against protestors. International
human rights standards and the United
Nations Human Rights Committee have
consistently implored signatories of the
International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) to prosecute military personnel in civilian courts when the
alleged conduct includes human rights
abuses. Additionally, in decisions such as
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights has
reiterated states’ obligations to discontinue
the prosecution of army personnel for
human rights violations in military courts.
Moreover, trials in Peru’s military courts
often end in impunity. Therefore, trying
military personnel for human rights abuses
in military courts could impede the justice
sought by Peru’s citizens.
During the 1980s and 1990s, the
Peruvian military committed numerous
human rights violations while fighting
domestic terrorism. Little justice has been
served for these abuses. Peruvian President
Alan García was in his first presidential
term from 1985 to 1990, and allegedly
authorized unnecessary use of military
force. During the Accomarca massacre in
August 1985, 69 unarmed civilians were
killed by the Peruvian armed forces in an
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anti-terrorism operation. Many of the accusations against President García are either
still under investigation or were archived
without a verdict. Given this history, military courts will not likely exercise impartiality, and use of the courts to prosecute
human rights violations will decrease both
deterrence and likelihood of justice.
Moreover, the mandates of military
courts often contravene international standards of judicial independence, transparency, and impartiality. Military courts frequently only investigate allegations against
lower ranking members, and may create discrepancies between the standards
applied to civilian and military human
rights violators. For this reason, military
courts are ill-suited to prosecute civil
human rights abuses.”
Decree 1095 also authorizes use of military force against protestors. The decree
itself does not criminalize protests or violate the rights of assembly and association;
however, human rights organizations are
concerned that it may open the door to
such violations based on the military’s
history. The decree could threaten social
movements and protests, which are a vital
means for democratic participation in
South America where lobbying opportunities are limited and weaker governments
have fragile checks and balances.
Decree 1095 may become especially
relevant to Cusco and Espinar community members who are currently protesting
planned irrigation systems that they believe
will constrict their own water supply.
Although two judicial rulings have postponed the government-led project until an
environmental impact assessment is completed, the government continues to move
forward in defiance of the court. The disregard of the court’s judgment is evidence
of the weak checks and balances. At least
one man has been killed and 28 injured in
the unrest. Social protests such as these are
an essential tool for balancing the government’s power. Nevertheless, protestors may
suffer violent consequences and human
rights violators will likely receive impunity
as a result of Decree 1095.
President García, whose primary
agenda has been economic development in
the country, argues that continuing with the
irrigation project is an economic benefit to
Peru’s population. He believes the irrigation will increase agricultural production

in other regions and provide an alternative
for the mining-dependent economy. Yet, his
issuance of Decree 1095 demonstrates that
he is more concerned with economic diversification than protection of fundamental
human rights of members of the Cusco and
Espinar communities.”
Decree 1095 represents a step backward for human rights in Peru. In 2009,
the country’s judicial system demonstrated
its independence in what was regarded as
a fair trial for bringing former President
Fujimori to justice for human rights
abuses. Moreover, Fujimori’s prosecution
was a victory against impunity. Because
Decree 1095 returns the prosecution of
human rights violations to military court
where impunity is likely, the progress made
over the last two decades may substantially
relapse. Considering the military’s abusive
history and the important function of social
movements in Peru, Decree 1095 dangerously opens the door to future abuses that
may never be redressed if tried in military
courts.

Contemporary Slavery In The
Bolivian Chaco
Approximately 600 Guarani families are
subjected to systems of debt bondage and
forced labor, primarily in agriculture, on
large estates in the Bolivian Chaco, according to a recent Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights report. Despite Bolivia’s
clear obligation to prohibit and prevent
slavery as a state party to the 1926 Slavery
Convention and International Labor
Convention (ILO) Convention 29 on forced
labor, the state has not sought to prosecute
the violators. The Guarani remain captive
primarily because of political divisions in
the country, which have weakened the state
and prevented prosecution.
The prohibition of slavery is considered jus cogens — a peremptory norm
from which no derogation is permissible
under international law. The 1926 Slavery
Convention defines slavery as the “condition of a person over whom any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.” In June 1930, the
ILO expanded the definition of slavery to
include forced labor through Convention
29 (ILO Convention 29). ILO Convention
29 defines forced labor as “all work or
service which is exacted from any person
under . . . penalty and for which the said
person has not offered himself voluntarily.”
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The incorporation of forced labor into the
definition of slavery effectively removed
the requirement of ownership from the
1926 Slavery Convention and its 1956
supplement.
Furthermore, the Slavery Convention’s
1956 supplement incorporates the concepts
of debt bondage and serfdom. Under the
1956 supplement, debt bondage is defined
as a condition in which one’s services to
pay a debt are not reasonably assessed
and applied to that debt, and serfdom as
a condition in which a person is forced
to live and labor on land belonging to
another without freedom to change his or
her status.
Bolivia is a state party to both the
Slavery Convention, its supplement,
and ILO Convention 29 on forced labor.
Bolivia’s domestic law, including both the
current and most recent Bolivian constitutions, also outlaws the practice of
forced labor. As do the Bolivian Criminal
Code and Supreme Decree Number 28159,
which specifically targets slavery of the
Guarani in the Chaco region.
Individuals may inherit the debt of
their parents and are often only permitted to repay it through more labor. Their
labor is then not applied fairly to the
debt—demonstrating the cyclical use of
forced labor and systematic debt bondage,
prohibited in the 1956 supplement to the
Slavery Convention. Forced laborers live
under threat of corporal punishment and
must perform excessive physical labor to
repay their debts to estate owners who have
coerced them into fraudulent contracts.
Compensation for labor is minimal or
given in-kind. The estate owner is the only
source of critical needs such as food, clothing, and medicine but sells the items at
prices excessively higher than the market.
This nominal compensation coupled with
the overpriced goods perpetuates ongoing
indebtedness. Furthermore, only the estate
owners record the payments and debts.
The families are not free to seek work
elsewhere, and if they insist on going to
another estate, they are usually sold along
with their debt, which is characterized a
form of serfdom.
Although the Bolivian government
acknowledges and condemns modern forms
of slavery, it has been unsuccessful in prosecuting violators because of a complex set
of financial and political challenges. Those
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challenges include a weak state presence
in the Chaco region and an insufficient
number of police, judges, prosecutors, and
public defenders. Additionally, many of the
landowners are in local or regional government positions.
However, as the issue gains more
attention, the most significant challenge
to enforcement is the political division
between the lowland region, where the
Guarani reside, and the rest of the country.
In recent years, the region has pushed for
increased autonomy from the central state
and the ruling party’s policies, including nationalization, agrarian reform, and
indigenous empowerment. If the regional
leaders enforce agrarian reform, it will be
contradictory to their expressed preference
for privatization. If they embrace indigenous repatriation, then they will contradict
their efforts to resist the 2009 constitution, which sought to give greater rights
to marginalized indigenous communities.
The political stalemate is preventing the
cooperation needed between regional and
national authorities to prosecute the estate
owners.
In spite of heavy political divisions, the
national government cannot ignore slavery
while making political compromises with
the eastern lowlands. The State has the
legal responsibility to meet its international
obligations and uphold its domestic law in
the case of the Guarani by devoting the
resources and political capital necessary
for prosecuting those responsible for slavery conditions in the Chaco region. Most
notably, the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights has scheduled a hearing for October 2010, where Bolivia will
report on any progress made in remedying
the situation, as per the Commissions suggestions at a prior hearing.
Jessica Lynd, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
Latin America for the Human Rights Brief.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Kiobel Decision Significantly
Limits Corporate Liability for
Human Rights Violations
In the face of allegations that Royal
Dutch Shell aided and abetted in human
rights violations perpetrated by the
Nigerian government, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

has rejected the theory that corporations
can be held liable in the United States
under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA).
If upheld, the recent Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum decision will significantly
limit legal recourse available to victims
of human rights abuses attributable to a
corporate entity.
In Kiobel, a group of residents from
the Ogoni region of Nigeria alleged that
government forces subjected members
of their community to summary executions, beatings, rapes, arbitrary arrests, and
destruction of property throughout 1993
and 1994. They further alleged that these
abuses aimed to reprimand a community
movement to protest the environmental
effects of oil exploration in the resourcerich region, and that the defendant Shell
provided significant financial and logistical assistance to the perpetrators. Filing
suit under the ATCA, the plaintiffs argued
that the corporation should be held liable
for what amounted to grave human rights
violations and crimes against humanity.
The court proceeded on the premise
that the scope of liability under the ATCA
is determined by customary international
law or norms that are “specific, universal,
and obligatory in the relations of states
inter se.” It then examined a broad range of
sources — international tribunals, treaties,
and the work of renowned academics —
and concluded that, while individual and
state liability has been firmly established
since Nuremberg, customary international
law to date has “steadfastly rejected” the
notion of corporate liability. There is no
basis, according to the court, for jurisdiction over Shell under the ATCA.
It might appear that this decision has
rendered the corporate entity eternally
immune in United States courts for any
abuses it may commit or support abroad.
Yet, in its opinion the court explicitly narrowed its position: until corporate liability
under international law evolves to the point
of universal recognition and acceptance so
as to constitute customary international
law, it cannot be the basis for an ATCA
claim.
Although there was speculation that
the U.S. Supreme Court might address
the issue of corporate liability under the
ATCA in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, it instead recently denied
the petition for certiorari in that case without explanation. Furthermore, Kiobel was
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recently adopted by the Second Circuit
in another ATCA case against Firestone,
alleging profit from forced labor and child
labor at its rubber plantation in Liberia.
Meanwhile, the Kiobel plaintiffs have
requested en banc review. If ultimately
upheld, however, the decision represents
a setback for human rights activists who
battled in recent years to revive ATCA and
expand the spectrum of legal options available against corporate entities that commit
or otherwise support human rights abuses
in pursuit of the bottom line.
The ramifications of the decision are
particularly far-reaching in certain regions
of sub-Saharan Africa, where vast natural
resources coexist with poor labor regulations, low standards of living, corrupt and
unstable regimes, and prolonged civil and
regional conflict. Many corporate entities
have been able to take deliberate advantage of these conditions without effective
regulation and often at the expense of local
communities.
The absence of local and regional justice mechanisms capable of effectively
holding corporate entities liable throughout
the continent has forced affected communities to seek forums for redress elsewhere.
Nigeria’s judicial system, for example,
is among the world’s most corrupt, and
circumstances such as those in Kiobel
reveal an intimate relationship between the
government and the corporate entity. Until
the decision in Kiobel, ATCA represented
one possible avenue to justice, although
prior ATCA claims against corporations
had only resulted in out-of-court settlements and raising awareness more generally. Where the case has been decided, as
in Bowoto v. Chevron arising out of events
in Nigeria, courts have ruled in favor of the
accused entity.
Other recent developments offer some
promise of better protection against human
rights violations attributable to corporate
dealings and objectives. The Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights in particular has been working to articulate the human rights obligations and responsibilities of corporate entities. Furthermore, recent court proceedings
against Trafigura in both the Netherlands
and Britain reflect an emerging commitment to hold corporations accountable in
those nations for violations committed
abroad. Despite these efforts, the Kiobel
decision exposes a void within the frame-
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work of international law based on the
legal status of corporate non-state actors
and the corresponding lack of international
enforcement mechanisms.
In his separate opinion, Judge Leval
stressed that Kiobel “deals a substantial
blow to international law and its undertaking to protect fundamental human rights.”
Ultimately, however, he concurred in the
decision, conceding that international law
to date “[does] not provide civil liability against any private actor and [does]
not provide for any form of liability of
corporations.” This legal truth is especially troubling in an era of fundamental
changes to the international world order,
in which corporations extend farther and
possess greater influence than many of the
states whose resources they pursue. Unless
the Kiobel decision receives a very bold
review and is overturned, it will remain for
the international community to establish
the norm of corporate liability without
the active participation of the U.S. court
system.

Elections Commission Approves
Former Warlord’s Presidential
Campaign: A Setback to Liberia’s
Rebuilding Process
As the citizens of Liberia prepare to
elect a new president in October 2011, the
National Elections Commission has ruled
that Prince Yormie Johnson may participate as a candidate in the race. A current
senator from Nimba County, Johnson is
more infamously known as a former warlord and leader of the since-disbanded
Independent National Patriotic Front of
Liberia (INPFL). As a breakaway faction
of Charles Taylor’s own rebel group, the
INPFL established a significant presence
in the early stages of Liberia’s civil war
by capturing, torturing, and killing thenPresident Samuel K. Doe in September
1990. Charles Taylor filled Doe’s vacant
post at the apex of Liberia’s crumbling
government, and the nation plunged further
into prolonged conflict.
In the following years, Liberia was
wracked by intensified fighting between
several rebel groups and Taylor’s government forces, with each carrying out systematic human rights violations against
civilians. Taylor fled the country in 2003
following the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement, and Liberia emerged from
civil war into a crippling humanitarian cri-

sis. Over 250,000 citizens had been killed
over nearly fourteen years of violence, and
over one-third of the population displaced.
The United Nations soon thereafter established a peacekeeping presence in Liberia,
and the post-conflict disarmament, reintegration, and reconciliation process began
to take shape.
One crucial element of the rebuilding
process was the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC), the legitimacy of
which has been severely undermined by the
National Election Commission’s decision.
The TRC was launched in 2006 to facilitate
the delicate process of Liberia’s rebirth and
renewal and to shed an accurate, unbiased
light on the root causes of the conflict,
the breadth of human rights and international law violations, the experiences of
women and children, and the exploitation
of natural resources in furtherance of wartime objectives. Despite deficiencies in its
process, ranging from limited resources
and scarce evidence to poor coordination
and internal discord, the TRC’s findings
reflect a commitment to the principles of
the mandate — justice, accountability, and
reconciliation — and a sincere desire to lay
a foundation for lasting peace and stability.
In its Final Report, issued in late 2009,
the TRC concluded that Prince Johnson was
the conflict’s most notorious perpetrator of
violence and disarray and recommended
that he face criminal prosecution for gross
violations of both domestic and international law. The Report also urged that, at
minimum, Johnson and other alleged perpetrators be restricted from holding public
office for a period of thirty years.
While the decision to admit Johnson
publicly undermines these conclusions, it
is nonetheless defensible on constitutional
grounds, as Liberia’s Constitution affords
all citizens the right to seek office, provided minimal demographic standards are
met. Implicit in the TRC’s recommendation, however, is a call to democratically
amend the Constitution, notably untouched
since prior to the outbreak of civil war,
to embed in its fabric higher standards of
eligibility intended to protect principles of
human rights. As any constitutional amendments must be ratified by referendum, the
effort would provide a rare opportunity for
the citizens of Liberia to raise a potent,
unified voice against impunity. Only with
the integrated efforts of the Elections
Commission could proposed amendments
35

gather momentum, yet their decision here
indicates that it will either ignore or consciously resist the TRC’s recommendation.
What will come of Prince Johnson’s
participation in the presidential race will
not be known until October 2011. While he
continues to draw support from within his
native Nimba County, international human
rights observers contend it is grounded not
in respect, but in fear that he will again
become a violent and destabilizing force
if not elected. The bitter memories of civil
war and indiscriminate violence linger in
the collective consciousness of Liberians,
and as a core perpetrator, Prince Johnson
remains a public face of this suffering.
In disregarding the TRC’s call for public
sanctions, the Elections Commission has
threatened the efficacy of an accountability
measure potentially capable of restoring
the confidence of Liberia’s weary population in its public institutions. It has sent a
telling message of free license to perpetrators and obstructed the aspirations of
others for a future that does not resemble
the past.
Christopher Tansey, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
Sub-Saharan Africa for the Human Rights Brief.

Europe
Égalité, Fraternité, Expulsé—
French Expulsion of the Roma
The French government’s recent policy to shut down Roma encampments in
France is drawing attention and criticism
from the European community. Many are
concerned with the potential violations
of the European Charter of Fundamental
Rights (ECFR) and the 2004 European
Union Freedom of Movement Directive
(Directive). Article II-81 of the ECFR
states that any discrimination based on ethnic or social origin shall be prohibited, and
Article II-79 of the ECFR prohibits collective expulsions. The Directive enforces
the rights of EU citizens and their family
members to move and reside freely within
member states; however, for periods of
residence longer than three months, member states can require registration by EU
citizens.
On September 29, 2010, the European
Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding,
told French radio that the European
Commission has launched infringement
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proceedings against France for breaching
the EU’s ban on ethnic discrimination.
The Commission’s action could lead to a
complaint at the Court of Justice of the
European Communities (Court).
A leaked September 11, 2010 document
from the French Ministry of the Interior
indicated that Roma from Romania and
Bulgaria are the principal targets of French
President Nicolas Sarkozy’s policy. From
August to September 2010, the French
government deported approximately 1,000
Roma. Most of the deportees have been put
on planes, mainly to Bucharest, Romania,
after receiving €300 per adult and €100
per child, and signing a declaration affirming that they are leaving voluntarily. The
remaining deportees were kicked out of
the country due to criminal records and
for violating residency registration requirements. Although the French government
justified the expulsion policy on the basis
that deported Roma resided in France for
over three months without work or residency permits, the September 11 document
suggests that the Roma were targeted on
account of their ethnicity.
This recent government action was
prompted by several riots that erupted in
the Loire Valley of Central France in July
2010, as a result of the shooting and killing
of a young French Roma Luigi Duquenet
by French police. Duquenet was shot at a
checkpoint after he recklessly drove and
hit a gendarme. Following the riots, the
French government decided to close down
300 encampments within three months.
Sarkozy described the Roma camps as
sources of “illicit trafficking, deeply disgraceful living conditions, and the exploitation of children through begging, prostitution, and delinquency.” By the end
of August 2010, the French government
dismantled over 128 encampments.
On September 9, 2010, the European
Parliament passed a Resolution by 337
votes to 245 calling on the French government to “immediately suspend all
expulsions of Roma,” and stating that
the policy “amounted to discrimination.”
In response to accusations of ethnic discrimination, the French government maintains that each expulsion is decided on
a case-by-case basis, and that national
security and the enforcement of immigration laws, not ethnicity, are the deciding
factors. On October 19, 2010, less than a
week before the Commission’s deadline for

France to change its policy, the European
Commission suspended infringement procedures against France. Commissioner
Reding stated that France “has responded
positively” and has promised to adopt procedural changes in the French Senate as per
the Commission’s requirements.
Nevertheless, the newly enacted policy
disproportionately effects the Roma population in France. Éric Besson, France’s
Minister of Immigration, said that the
ECFR, which outlaws discrimination on
ethnic grounds, is respected scrupulously
in France, and the government only targeted and expelled individuals who posed
a threat to public order. Besson further
emphasized that “no collective expulsions
were undertaken.”
Beyond the immediate consequences
for the local Roma populations, the French
policy may have significant implications
on the interpretation of EU legislation.
This policy discredits the authority of legal
standards set forth in the ECFR, which
ensures that the EU protects the rights of
citizens in its member states. The infraction proceedings initiated against France
before the Court will determine how EU
legislation on freedom of movement and
minority rights will be interpreted and
applied uniformly across all EU member
states. The Court’s ruling will bear importance to future efforts to hold EU member
states accountable for the respect of human
rights of other member states’ citizens. The
level to which France is held responsible
for implementing European law into its
domestic law will set a precedent for the
punishment of future violations of minority rights.

France’s Burqa Ban Passes
Constitutional Muster
The French government’s ban on clothing that covers individuals’ faces when in
public, including the burqa and the niqab
worn by Muslim women, has passed its
last domestic legal hurdle. The burqa is a
full-body garment with a narrow gauzecovered eye opening, while the niqab,
has just a narrow eye opening. France’s
Concealment Act (Act), which prohibits the covering of the face in a public
space, passed through France’s National
Assembly and Senate with overwhelming
support earlier this year. On October 11,
2010, the Constitutional Council’s decision
No. 2010-613 rendered the Act constitu36

tional. Despite constitutional approval, the
legality of the Act may be brought into
question before the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR).
The French Constitutional Council
(Council), France’s highest legal authority, ruled that the law does not create disproportionate punishments and therefore
conforms to the constitution. The Council
found that the Act conformed to Article 10
of the French Constitution pertaining to
religious expression, after amending the
text to state: the ban cannot apply in places
of worship. The Council did not specifically mention the wearing of face-covering
clothing in mosques, but it did suggest
that extending the ban to places of public
worship might violate religious freedom.
Anyone violating the ban will be subject
to a fine of €150 or required to complete a
citizenship course, and anyone who forces
another individual to conceal her face in
public will be subject to a one-year prison
term or a fine of up to €30,000.
This new law extends the prohibitions
of French law No. 2004-228 of 15 March
2004, which banned the displaying or
wearing of overt religious symbols in all
public schools, including headscarves
worn by Muslim schoolgirls. The 2004 law
specifically applies to the public display
of religious symbols or clothing, whereas
the text of the Concealment Act does not
make explicit reference to Islam or the
Islamic veil. French President, Nicolas
Sarkozy has eluded that the Act is aimed
at Muslim women, stating: “The burqa is
not a religious sign, it’s a sign of subservience, a sign of debasement . . . It will not
be welcome on the territory of the French
Republic.” However, the Concealment Act
does not specifically mention the words
“Muslim,” “women,” or “veil” in any of
its six articles; rather, the law generally
references clothing designed to cover the
face. Nevertheless, many fear that the Act
will disproportionately stigmatize France’s
Muslim population, the largest in Europe.
Many human rights organizations,
including Amnesty International, view the
ban as a violation of essential human rights
defined by the Charter for the Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (Charter)
and the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), to which France is a state
party. Both Article 9 of the ECHR and
Article 10 of the Charter seek to ensure
the freedom to manifest religion or belief
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in worship and observance. The same is
true for Article 18 of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and Article 18 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). Concurrently, the principal
document enunciating women’s rights,
the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW) recognizes a state obligation to
take measures to abolish laws, regulations,
customs, and practices that discriminate
against women (Article 2) and to modify
social and cultural patterns to eliminate
discriminatory practices (Article 5).
Rather than an infringement on religious freedom, the French government
views the decision by the Council as an
important affirmation of French values
– equality between men and women, and
secularism. The French government also
justifies the ban on the basis of national
security. French authorities assert that “the
ability to cover the face in a public place
is a security hazard in a time of increased
threat from terrorist organizations.”
Now that France’s Constitutional
Council has approved the Concealment
Act, only the ECtHR can strike it down
and render a binding opinion on France.
The likely success of a claim against the
ban before the ECtHR is uncertain. In
Aktas, Bayrakand and others v. France (no.
435631/08) decision of June 30, 2009, the
ECtHR rejected the admissibility of complaints filed by four Muslim girls and two
Sikh boys, who were expelled from public
schools in France in 2004 for violating the
law prohibiting the wearing of clothing
or symbols expressly showing the students’ religion. The ruling upheld the 2004
law reasoning that the restrictions on the
manifestation of religion were necessary
to guarantee public order and maintain the
rights and freedoms of others.
The French law reflects a growing tension between the right to religious freedom
in a secular country and the affirmation of
women’s rights, two principles that are promoted and protected by international law.
While France claims the new law is a step
forward for the rights of Muslim women
and Muslim leaders concur that Islam does
not require women to hide their faces, the
ban elicits outcries from both Muslim fundamentalists and human rights advocates.
With this new law, France may be trying
to enforce women’s rights within CEDAW,

but in doing so, France is infringing on
what many Muslim women in France may
regard as their religious freedoms.
Molly Hofsommer, a J.D. candidate at the
American University Washington College of Law,
covers Europe for the Human Rights Brief.

South and Central Asia
Rape Victims Subjected to “Finger”
Test in India
In India, physicians are allowed to
perform a “finger” test on rape victims to
determine their level of sexual activity. If a
physician is able to insert two fingers into
the victim’s vagina, she may be considered
“habituated” to sex. Results of the examination are admissible in court and can be
used to undermine the credibility of an
unmarried rape survivor, according to a
recent Human Rights Watch report. There
are several international instruments that
commit states, including India, to uphold a
women’s right to pursue medical attention
and legal remedies, and would prohibit the
use of the finger test.
The international community has
taken measures to stop sexual violence
and encourage the prosecution of sexual
offenders. According to United Nations
Resolution 62/134 (Resolution), states are
obligated to exercise due diligence to prevent, investigate, and punish sexual crimes.
The Resolution further urges states, “[to]
provide victims with access to appropriate
health care, including sexual and reproductive health care, psychological care, and
trauma [counseling].”
Various international laws protect women’s rights. Article 5 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
forbids “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” India ratified the Convention on the
Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), and article
5(a) of CEDAW obligates states to “modify
. . . social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women” to prevent prejudice
based on gender stereotypes. Article 12 of
the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
extends the “ . . . right of everyone to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.”
The finger test likely violates the
women’s rights articulated in the UDHR,
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CEDAW, and ICESCR. Furthermore, the
finger test may deter rape victims who fear
subjection to such an invasive procedure or
the potentially damaging results from coming forward. In addition to violating clearly
established international human rights law,
the finger test, by creating a potential disincentive for women to come forward after
being raped, also undermines the justice
system by allowing some rapists to escape
punishment.
India has taken some steps to prevent
the use of the finger test. In 2005, the
Supreme Court of India held in State of
Uttar Pradesh v. Pappu that a rape victim’s
prior sexual activity is irrelevant. More
recently, on October 23, 2010, Additional
Sessions Judge Kamini Lau condemned
the finger test in a rape case before her
court. She said, “The test is violative of the
fundamental right to privacy of the victim
. . . State action cannot be a threat to the
constitutional right of an individual. What
has shocked my conscience is that this test
is being carried out in a routine manner on
victims of sexual offences (even minors)
by doctors.” She recommended that police
should be sensitized to the issue. The court
opinion stated that courts should review
irrelevant procedures and reject immaterial
evidence. It is yet to be seen whether the
Delhi court’s order will be followed.
Furthermore, there is a proposed amendment in the legislature to the Criminal Law
Bill, which states, “previous sexual experience with any person shall not be relevant
on the issue of such consent or the quality
of consent.” Also this year, India established a committee, headed by Justice Gita
Mittal, to consider further amendments to
sexual violence laws. The committee has
not yet released a formal response to the
use of the finger test.
Despite efforts by the national court
system, legislature, and medical organizations to ban the finger test, local doctors,
attorneys, judges, and police officers are
still authorizing the test. Human Rights
Watch identified eighteen Indian states,
including three major Mumbai hospitals,
which still use the finger test. In June 2010,
the Maharashtra government standardized
how many fingers to use during the test,
and earlier this year, the Delhi government
requested reports regarding whether the
orifice is “roomy” or “narrow.” The inaction of India’s national government shows
that it is either unable or unwilling to
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enforce the Supreme Court’s five-year-old
decision.
Despite attempts to dissuade the use of
the finger test, the practice is still used on
women in a country with the second largest population in the world, even though
the finger test clearly violates international
laws and obligations to protect the right to
privacy and bodily integrity.

Accountability in Sri Lanka?
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation
Commission
Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and
Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)
has come under scrutiny for its lack of
accountability and efficacy as a truthseeking mechanism. While the LLRC
has made some progressive suggestions,
like the need to improve conditions for
internally displaced persons (IDPs), it has
also rejected assistance from international
experts. Faced with allegations of war
crimes committed by Sri Lankan forces
and rebel group members, Sri Lanka and
the international community have not taken
the necessary steps to ensure accountability for the alleged crimes.
Typically, a truth commission is a nonjudicial body that is tasked with investigating past wrongdoings. Much of its
success depends on its transparency and
accountability, which in turn relies on
its autonomy. Truth-seeking mechanisms
work to end impunity by exposing information about past human rights violations
to the public.
In an apparent effort to stave off international scrutiny, Sri Lankan President
Mahinda Rajapaksa established the LLRC
in May 2010 to investigate the failure of
the Norwegian-brokered peace process.
For 25 years, the Sri Lankan government
fought against the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam (LTTE). In 2009, at the end of
the conflict, government forces pushed the
LTTE into a small area in northeastern Sri
Lanka. U.S. State Department reports and
interest groups allege that the government
and the rebel group are jointly responsible for 7,000 civilian casualties, tens of
thousands of injured civilians, and forced
disappearances.
Survivors have stated that the government killed rebels who surrendered,
a violation of Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions requiring the humane treat-

ment of combatants who have laid down
their arms. Human rights and relief organizations have also accused the government
of blocking humanitarian aid, including
aid from the Red Cross. Further, international observers have alleged that the Sri
Lankan government intentionally bombed
and attacked facilities in areas populated
by minority groups, violating Geneva
Convention IV, which protects civilians
from direct military attacks.
Numerous human rights organizations
have criticized the LLRC’s mandate as
too narrow and ill-equipped to investigate
alleged war crimes in 2009. Furthermore,
similar commissions in Sri Lanka in the
past thirty years have suffered from a
lack of transparency. With this in mind,
the United Nations (UN) is pressuring Sri
Lanka to consent to an investigation of
the events that took place from January to
May 2009, but Sri Lanka refuses UN participation in the truth-seeking process. UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has set up
a panel of three experts on international
law to report on legal standards applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka. The UN
panelists are available as a “resource” to
the LLRC at the discretion of the government. Sri Lankan authorities, however,
have denied the need for an oversight panel
and reasserted the LLRC’s internal autonomy. In June, Sri Lanka denied the panelists’ visas to enter the country, and a Sri
Lankan Cabinet minister led demonstrations against the UN in Colombo in July.
Despite an international outcry that Sri
Lankan forces and the LTTE violated international humanitarian law during the end of
the conflict, Sri Lankan Defense Secretary
Nandasena Gotabhaya Rajapaksa denies
that these allegations have been brought to
his attention. Gotabhaya Rajapaksa refuted
reports of civilian deaths during the conflict, arguing that what were perceived as
civilian deaths were in fact rebels in civilian disguise. In a June 2010 interview with
the BBC, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa further
attempted to suppress the investigation
when he threatened to execute a general
who promised to cooperate with investigations of war violations.
Sri Lanka has benefited from financial
aid and increased tourism since the end of
the conflict and, in the last fiscal year, has
received more foreign aid than ever before.
However, there has been no accountability
for the crimes committed by the Sri Lankan
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forces or the LTTE. In order to increase
the pressure on Sri Lanka to take action,
the United States and UN could work with
the World Bank, International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and China, the most generous provider of aid, to impose sanctions
on Sri Lanka until it can account for the
effectiveness of the LLRC. As another
option to pressure Sri Lanka, the UN
Security Council could take steps to create
an international ad-hoc tribunal under its
UN Charter Chapter VII powers. However,
a first step toward accountability would be
allowing the UN panel to meet with the
LLRC in Sri Lanka.
Misty Seemans, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
South and Central Asia for the Human Rights Brief.

East Asia
China Infringes on Religious
Freedoms
On November 1, 2010, a new regulation tightening Chinese control over
Tibetan monasteries entered into effect.
According to Xinhua, the official news
agency of China, the new “Management
Measure for Tibetan Buddhist Monasteries
and Temples” prohibits foreign individuals and organizations from involvement
in monastery affairs. China hopes that the
measure will minimize negative foreign
impact on public order, health, and the
fundamental rights and freedoms of others. Although a notice issued by China’s
State Administration for Religious Affairs
(SARA) specifies that “legitimate” rights
and interests of the Tibetan Buddhist religion remain protected under law, one implication of the new regulation is that any
connections between the Tibetan Buddhists
living in China and those living in exile,
including the Dalai Lama, are illegal. The
new measure is contrary to China’s own
Constitution and its 2005 Regulations on
Religious Affairs (RRAs), which were
established to “ensur[e] citizens’ freedom
of religious belief,” because it limits the
influence of the religion’s leaders and
scholars who do not pose a threat public
order, health, and morals or fundamental
rights and freedoms of others.
China’s Constitution and the 2005
RRAs protect the freedom of religion
in Tibet. Article 36 of the Chinese
Constitution states that “[c]itizens of the
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People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief ” and that “[n]o
state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe
in, or not believe in, any religio[n].” The
RRAs, established to protect the freedom
of religion, use language similar to that
in the Constitution, and further state that
the government “protects normal religious
activities, and safeguards the lawful rights
and interests of religious bodies, sites for
religious activities and religious citizens.”
Despite these protections, China justifies limiting foreign influence on Tibetan
monasteries based on a provision outlined
in Article 3 of the RRAs. This provision
states that, “No organization or individual
may make use of religion to engage in
activities that disrupt public order, impair
[the] health of citizens or interfere with
the educational system of the State, or in
other activities that harm State or public
interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and
interests.” A similar provision exists in
Article 36 of the Chinese Constitution.
While the provision itself does not limit
religious freedom, China’s application of
this provision effectively limits the religious freedom of Tibetan Buddhists.
Prohibiting the influence of foreigners
on monastery affairs limits the religious
freedom of Tibetan Buddhists because it
restricts the Dalai Lama’s involvement in
the religion, as well as that of a majority
of Tibetan Buddhism’s scholars. The Dalai
Lama is the exiled leader of the largest
and most influential school of Tibetan
Buddhism, whose role dates back to the
16th century and has since been a continual and central practice. According to
the Central Tibetan Administration, “The
religious heads and scholars of Tibetan
Buddhism as a whole are, currently, living
outside Tibet. Hence, the lineage of the
sacred Buddhist teachings and initiations
can be said to be existing in the exiled
Tibetan community.” As a result, the new
measure will “obstruct the Buddhist teaching and its sacred transmissions inside
Tibet and mak[e] it extremely difficult for
the monastic institutions to undertake their
important religious activities.”
China considers the new measure appropriate because it believes that foreign influences, including the Dalai Lama, have
encouraged Tibetan Buddhists to act in a
way that offends public safety, order, health,
or morals, or the fundamental rights and

freedoms of others, violating Article 3 of
the RRAs. A notice by SARA explaining
the purpose of the new measures accuses the
Dalai Lama and his followers of “plot[ting]
and spread[ing] confusion in the Tibetan
areas,” ultimately leading to serious influence over Tibetan Buddhists. The notice
may be specifically referring to the 2008
protests in Tibet and similar political unrest
for which the Chinese government blames
the Dalai Lama. Although the protests were
carried out by Tibetan Buddhists, the Dalai
Lama maintains that they were a result of
widespread discontent with the Chinese
government, and were unrelated to Tibetan
Buddhism as a religion.
The Dalai Lama has continuously
objected to the use of violence in any form,
including in protests related to the status
of Tibet. It is unlikely that his influence
has caused Tibetan Buddhists to engage
in activities which “disrupt public order,
impair [the] health of citizens or interfere
with the educational system of the State, or
. . . harm State or public interests, or citizens’ lawful rights and interests.” Barring
some indication that the Dalai Lama’s
influence has caused Tibetan Buddhists to
engage in these kinds of activities, the new
measure is contrary to the protection of
religious freedom in China’s Constitution
and the 2005 RRAs.

Migrant Workers or Refugees?
China’s Obligations to North
Korean Defectors
China and North Korea recently
increased efforts to find North Koreans
seeking refuge in China. According to a
recent report by Asahi Shimbun, a Japanese
daily newspaper, the two countries’ joint
efforts have already resulted in the capture of dozens of North Koreans. Since
the mid 1990s, hundreds of thousands of
North Koreans have attempted to cross the
border into China. This year’s food shortages have resulted in many more desperate
North Koreans seeking to enter China in
search of food. By repatriating these North
Koreans, China may be violating its obligations under the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, if
North Korean defectors can be considered
refugees and have individualized concern
for their life or freedom.
China considers North Korean defectors to be illegal economic migrants, and
as a result, repatriates them in accordance
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with a bilateral treaty between the two
countries. Because leaving North Korea
without permission is considered treason,
repatriated individuals face imprisonment, torture, and death. China has been
accused of being partially responsible for
the human rights violations occurring in
North Korea, as well as violating its obligations as a signatory to the 1951 Convention
and its 1967 Protocol.
The 1951 Convention on the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol exist to
protect the rights of refugees. Article 33 of
the Convention establishes the principle of
non-refoulement, stating: “No Contracting
State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account
of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion.” While specifically outlined in the
Convention, the principle of non-refoulement is also considered customary international law. This principle prohibits the
return of refugees to their home countries
if they face danger or persecution there.
Under the 1951 Convention, a “refugee”
is a person “who, owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” is
unable or unwilling to return to his country.
Because many of the North Korean defectors are leaving for economic reasons and
not because of persecution related to “race,
religion, nationality, membership of a . . .
social group or political opinion,” China
defines them as illegal economic migrants.
The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) distinguishes
between economic migrants and refugees,
noting that individuals leaving their home
countries for purely economic reasons are
economic migrants. Nevertheless, UNHCR
also recognizes that the distinction between
economic and political actions within a
country is not always clear. For example,
if economic sanctions or decisions on the
part of a government have political intentions, one might be considered a refugee
instead of an economic migrant. China’s
blanket classification of all North Koreans
as illegal economic migrants means that at
least some and possibly all North Koreans
who are entitled to refugee status are
wrongly repatriated as illegal economic
migrants.

Human Rights Brief, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 7
Despite these blurred definitions,
UNHCR believes that at least some of the
North Koreans being repatriated by China
definitely meet the criteria for refugee status. Human Rights Watch considers most
North Koreans in China to be refugees
sur place (in place) because, even those
who initially fled North Korea for economic reasons, fear persecution if they
are forced to return. UNHCR describes
refugees sur place as individuals who have
not necessarily left the country illegally
or as individuals who qualify as refugees
at a later date. UNHCR calls for special
consideration of situations in which a person’s actions may have been noticed by the
authorities in the person’s home country,
and how those actions may be viewed by
those authorities. Under this definition,
even if North Koreans were not refugees
when they left the country, the fear of persecution upon return to the country qualifies them as refugees.
China’s reluctance to grant asylum to
North Koreans is, in part, due to policy concerns. Acceptance of North Koreans could
lead to an increase in individuals crossing
the border, leaving China with a permanent
refugee population. Additionally, action
on China’s part could strain the relationship between the two countries, ultimately
decreasing the significant influence China
presently has over North Korea, and destabilizing North Korea generally.
Because China does not grant UNHCR
access to the border or to North Koreans
already in China, concrete information
regarding the reasons for leaving North
Korea and the persecution faced upon
return is difficult to obtain. The lack of
information makes it impossible to determine with certainty the refugee status of
most individuals. The recent crackdown on
North Koreans by the two countries will
only increase the number of individuals
whose rights are violated as a result of the
repatriation policy. China’s policy concerns, however, are not acceptable reasons
to refuse UNHCR access to the border or
to fail to comply with obligations under the
1951 Convention and its 1967 Protocol.
Kaitlin Brush, a J.D. candidate at the American
University Washington College of Law, covers
East Asia for the Human Rights Brief.

Southeast Asia and Oceania
November 7th Elections in
Burma: The Next Stop on Burma’s
“Roadmap to Democracy”?
On November 7, 2010, Burma held
its first elections since the 1990 elections
that produced dramatic victories for the
National League for Democracy (NLD).
Despite the previous election’s conclusive
results, the military junta ruling Burma
refused to hand over power to the NLD.
The recent elections, officially announced
on August 13, 2010, were potentially a significant step from military to civilian rule,
as outlined in the Burmese government’s
policy called the Roadmap to Democracy,
originally released to the public in 2003.
However, several developments prior to the
elections, including the exclusion of political prisoners from voting, and the closure
of polls in many border townships, home to
minority ethnic groups, indicated that even
though the Roadmap calls for “fair and free
elections,” the November 7 elections were
not going to be free nor fair.
Leaders and organizations from around
the world, including United Nations
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), urged Burmese leaders to
change their election policies. Article 21,
Section 3 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) is generally
accepted as a reflection of customary international law regarding elections: “[t]he
will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government; this will shall be
expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret vote
or by equivalent free voting procedures.”
Although Burma is not a state party to
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR), its failure to live
up to the standards set forth in the UDHR
may seriously undermine the validity of the
elections.
One of the main issues under contention
was a Burmese law that prohibits political
prisoners from participating in any election
activity, including voting. On September
23, 2010, Amnesty International called for
the immediate and unconditional release
of all political prisoners in Burma. On
election day, about 2,200 individuals were
being held on the basis of political beliefs,
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including Aung San Suu Kyi, leader of the
former NLD. Suu Kyi, joined by her other
NLD colleagues, called for the boycott of
the elections. Labeling them “unfair and
unjust,” Suu Kyi missed the opportunity
to run for office in the elections as she
was freed from house arrest on November
13, just one week after the elections took
place. The junta did, however, give Suu
Kyi permission to vote in the November
7 elections on the grounds that her political imprisonment, unlike other political
prisoners, was served through house arrest,
not jail.
By closing several polling stations on
the eastern border in the interest of “security,” the junta invited even more criticism
of the November elections. In total, more
than 300 villages in 33 townships were
disenfranchised due to the premature poll
closing. Those same townships are home
to minority ethnic groups who have refused
in the past to join the Burmese border
guard. The government failed to provide
any alternative options for voting to the
disenfranchised, such as an absentee ballot
or transportation to another polling station, violating the democratic principles of
equal and universal suffrage pertinent to
customary international law.
On September 28, 2010, Burmese
Foreign Minister Nyan Win spoke before
the UN General Assembly, insisting that
the junta is committed to doing its best
to ensure successful, free, and fair elections. Alluding to the restrictive election
measures, Win commented that Burma
has, “ample experiences and lessons learnt
in holding multiparty general elections.”
Although Win did not directly address
the junta’s rationale for the polling station
closures, experts believe it was a combination of security and economic concerns,
citing a lack of ceasefires in ongoing
conflicts between armed ethnic groups and
the Burmese military, as well as an interest
in preserving border security to maintain
increasing trade with China. The junta
failed to ensure “universal and equal suffrage” by making the November 7 elections
accessible to all, falling short of its responsibility under Article 21 of the UDHR.
Such a failure severely undermines not
only Burma’s “Roadmap to Democracy,”
by discrediting a core goal of the plan,
but will delegitimize further efforts, real
or contrived, to democratize Burma in the
near term.
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Thailand in Trouble
In early October, the Thai government
announced that it would extend the rule
of emergency law in Bangkok and three
other provinces adjacent to the capital
for another three months. The Thai government’s April 2009 original enactment
of an emergency decree, due to political upheaval, has given way to many
human rights abuses, such as censorship
of expression and restraints on peaceful
assembly. The extension comes at a time
when the government, currently holding
the UN Human Rights Council presidency,
has articulated fears of renewed violence
due to political protests and, more importantly, politically motivated bombings
since March 2010. The factual basis under
which the extension was granted, however, is increasingly dubious. Many critics
believe it is a way to silence the political
opposition, a move Thailand vigorously
denies. Additionally, reports from political
prisoners allege that Thailand is stepping
outside of the permitted boundaries of an
emergency decree, under international law,
by violating non-derogable rights protected
in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
As a state party to the ICCPR, Thailand
is legally obligated to abide by the provisions of the Covenant. Article 4 of the
Covenant states that during a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation
and the existence of which is officially
proclaimed” the states may take measures
“derogating from their obligations under
the present Covenant to the extent strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under
international law.” A further stipulation is

that the state party to the Covenant must
immediately inform the other States Parties
of its decision to derogate. To the extent
that it has complied with the notification
requirement, Thailand promptly informed
the international community of both its
decision to derogate and of the subsequent
extension, insisting that the extension of
the emergency decree was a necessary
move to preserve stability.
National and international human rights
advocates question whether the “life of the
nation” has truly been threatened by the
recent increase in political demonstrations,
as the protests in Bangkok had been peaceful until one month after the enactment of
the emergency decree. If the ongoing situation in Thailand does not constitute a threat
to the “life of the nation,” it would mean
that Thailand has illegally derogated from
the treaty, violating fundamental human
rights and other Articles of the ICCPR.
Specifically, there is evidence that the
rights under Articles 9, 19 and 21 of the
ICCPR, or the right to freedom from
arbitrary arrest, the right to freedom of
opinion and expression, and the right to
peaceful assembly and association, respectively, are being violated. Currently, internet censorship, forced closures of certain
media groups (such as radio stations),
and arrests and “silencing” of political opposition members, are among the
charges. The Centre for the Resolution of
the Emergency Situation (CRES), a group
created by the government and military “to
coordinate and administer the Emergency
Decree,” have disabled or censored 1,500
websites, radio and television stations, and
print publications since early April 2010.
Additional provisions under the emergency
law stipulate that arrestees can be detained
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for 30 days without charge or trial, while
conferring immunity from prosecution for
officials who have violated human rights in
the performance of their duties.
Perhaps the most troublesome charges
for the government are the reports of
political prisoners who, while waiting for
further judicial proceedings, are beaten and
tortured in detention centers. If true, the
tortuous practices would directly violate
Article 7 of the ICCPR, the right to not
be subject to “torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment,”
thereby making Thailand’s derogation illegal under international law, as subsection
2 of Article 4 explicitly prohibits derogations from Article 7, among others (not to
mention other international prohibitions of
torture).
If the allegations are true and abuses
of derogated rights are found, Thailand
could face international investigations and
even more serious repercussions from the
international community, especially at a
time when it holds a leadership position
on global human rights. Although Thailand
has complied with its notification duty
under Article 4 of the ICCPR, the foundation of its decision to enact and extend an
emergency decree is highly questionable.
With allegations that its emergency decree
is curtailing the rights of many individuals—at the very least their right to free
speech and assembly—Thailand’s global
authority and position on human rights, in
general, may be irreparably damaged.
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